Budget.What for do we need a budget? Do we need it at all? .

Introduction. The budget system provides the means to decide how much money to spend, what to spend it on, and how to raise the money they have decided to spend. Through the budget system, they determine the allocation of resources among the agencies of the Government. The budget system focuses primarily on dollars, but it also allocates other resources, such as Federal employment. The decisions made in the budget process affect the nation as a whole, State and local governments, and individuals. Many budget decisions have worldwide significance. The Government and the President enact budget decisions into law. The budget system ensures that these laws are carried out. Within this work we`d like to provide an overview of the budget system and explains some of the more important budget concepts. The following section discusses the budget process and budget execution. The next section provides information on budget coverage, including a discussion of on-budget and off-budget amounts, functional classification, how budget data is arrayed, types of funds, and full cost budgeting, etc.

Content: Introduction – p.2. Basis of the budget – p.3. 1. The budget process – p.3. 2. Budget types – p.3. 3. Сriticism of the current budgeting system – p.4. 4. Beyond Budgeting company and traditional budgeting company – p.4. 5. What are the advantages and drawbacks of the «fixed performance contract» in comparison with «traditional budget» - p.5. Conclusion – p.8. References – p.9.

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