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Transdniestria and "Gagauzia" in Southern Moldova; "New Yugoslavia" formed

by different pieces of "independent Serbias" and Montenegro.

            Figure 7 gives a general outlook of the scenario. The European political map appears less fragmented, especially in Eastern Europe, but seems even stranger and more risky than in the first scenario. It is understandable that newly aggregated states bring different minorities together, thereby diminishing their number and other parameters, except that of average strength. However, sometimes the process may be just the opposite.

            Table 4 includes all three scenarios. Simple comparison leads to a statement that the shifts are much more radical in the East than in the West. The number of states is diminishing near threefold in both the Balkans and the ex-URSS. Moreover, in Southeastern Europe, the second version of the political map suggests the minimal number of actors if compared with the initial point. The Western fluctuations are less impressive. There is no effect for the number of ethnic areas for the whole of the West, while in the East they become less numerous than in the previous scenario.

            The other three figures indicate the process of "optimization" step by step for Southeastern Europe in particular. The redrawn map makes the states more and more ethnically homogenous, and ethnic areas less and less populous. However, the map itself indicates the price paid for such a "progress" - the loss of compactness and the inevitable mutual enclaves of Slavic or Muslim populations in former Yugoslavia. In Western Europe, the newly aggregated nations also provide some improvement of the totals, percentages and means.

            In this scenario, the worst situation is characteristic for the former Soviet republics. Any recombination makes the states less monoethnic in comparison with the rest of Europe. The area recovers its primary position, in terms of total population of ethnic areas, and the difference in their shares goes up. Consequently, the present status-quo (paradoxically far from being stable) looks much more acceptable for this portion of Europe.

            As for European Russia, the interest is more in disintegration than in re-integration, since the latter scenario elevates as much as twice the total of its non-Russian population located in their homelands. Together, with its largest number of such homelands, the role of the major European non-melting pot is guaranteed, while the first scenario promises to solve many problems, at least with the Caucasian zone.

            One or both of the scenarios may or may not come true, whether they are expected or not, and in either order. Furthermore, there could be some third way or any given number of ways besides the two, especially beyond the nation-state model as a base, like multinational integration Unions (EU and CIS). Beyond fantasies (perhaps less surrealistic then developed above), they could serve the best "outer locks" for ethnic claims and secessionism. A Europe of regions or localities (either ethnic, economic, social or natural), as well as a Europe of one or two superpowers, suggest well-known alternative resolutions. The former sounds new, while the latter appears as emerging from history. In fact, the two are rather interrelated and complementary.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

            First, let us emphasize once more the hope that what is expected may never occur; examination of the unexpected, at least, can prevent us from a surprise. "Knowledge itself is power"; Francis Bacon's words justify human curiosity but warn against careless games with knowledge. Europe is too old and too crowded for a new geopolitical catastrophe. That is why we must know more about any possible geopolitical mishaps.

            Neither the fall of empires, nor the occurrence of bloody wars, nor the "peaceful" divorce of multiethnic countries could solve social and economic problems related to ethnic areas. The term "national state" is quite different from a monoethnic state, and for the east of the continent, the problem is by which means to break the relationship between these two notions in the mentality of people. First, it is necessary to use all well-known leverages, such as cultural autonomy, the creation of territorial units crossing ethnic boundaries, of special legislative and electoral systems, and of special minorities' representation. It is also possible to develop flexible forms of associations between the state and regions at all territorial levels - of the federal, confederal or of some intermediate type, based on multi- or bilateral agreements, etc. (like in Russian case).  

            Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the general number of people belonging to national minorities in their ethnic areas in the post-Soviet space has been reduced several times. This is true for most former Union republics, with the important exception of Russia. At the same time, as in Europe as a whole during the past remaking of its political map, the number of "area" minorities has multiplied. The new nation-states leave to each other as a kind of hostages their important (or small, but militant) ethnic groups. It is worthwhile to recall the presence of Russians in Ukraine, of Ukrainians in Russia, of both groups in the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Republic of Moldova, and of Armenians in Karabakh (Azerbaidjan).

            It is possible to distinguish two types of ethnic areas. The first type consists of small, but contiguous and overlapping areas with a high conflict potential and strong political mobilization of minorities. This type may be described as "Balkan" or "Caucasian". The other type of ethnic areas includes minorities which are large by all measures, often represented in several ethnic areas, and are difficult to mobilize. This second form is typical of large, vast countries with a large population, like Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. These ethnic areas are more similar to Western European minorities and ethnic areas than those of the "Balkan" or "Caucasian" type.

            Finally, Western Europe and the former Soviet Union turned out similar under the re-integration scenario which looks "non-efficient" in terms of general minority dynamics. The difference consists in the fact that in the East further disintegration still is quite possible as a continuation of the last wave. As for the West, the question, probably, could be solved without too many painful losses, if (once again) it manages to find the right way by avoiding the negative eastern experience.

The author Konstantin Axenov, Victor Koloskov

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