HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?

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On April 9, the CPCS announced its ‘Action Programme’, officially known as ‘Czechoslovakia’s Road to Socialism’, as a basis for reforming communism in the country. In this document the CPCS promised: (1) new guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly and religious observance;
(2) electoral laws to provide a broader choice of candidates, greater freedom for the four non-communist parties within the National Front; (3) upgrading of the parliament and the government with regard to the power of the CPCS apparatus; (4) broad economic reforms to give enterprises greater independence, to achieve a convertible currency, to revive a limited amount of private enterprise and to increase trade with Western countries; (5) an independent judiciary; (6) federal status for Slovakia on an independent basis and a new constitution to be drafted by the end of 1969.[9] The
Central Committee also pledged a “full and just rehabilitation of all persons” who had been unjustly persecuted during 1949 -1954.

But this programme promised less than the people actually wanted. The
‘Action Programme’ remained outside the mainstream of the powerful social process which had been set in motion in January.[10] The people expected more reforms, more freedom. But Dubcek and other reformats tried to be more moderate, to find the way for the gradual reforms. The Presidium of the
CPCS prohibited the renovation of the Social Democratic Party and the
Ministry of Interior announced that the formation of political parties would be considered illegal. But at the same time this Ministry sanctioned the activity of the Club of Engaged Non-Party Members (KAN), and recognised the legal statute of another big club - K-231.

Gradually the reformats found themselves in the position which will become vital for them all. They found themselves between two different forces. One force was the majority of the Czech and the Slovak nations who wanted more radical changes. The other force was represented by the
Stalinists, by Moscow, and by the leadership of the other countries of the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO).

One of the major reforms was the law of June 26, which abolished prepublication censorship. On the next day the famous manifesto, entitled
‘2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists and Everyone’ appeared in Literarni listy. The manifesto gave assurances of complete support of Dubcek’s regime, “if necessary, even with arms.”[11]

The leaders of the SU, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany viewed the reforms taking place in Czechoslovakia as the threat for all the
Communist Bloc. The first clearly expressed concern was so-called Warsaw
Letter. It was sent on July 15, 1968, and addressed to the Central
Committee of the CPCS. It proved the clear evidence of the WTO leaders’ lack of confidence in the leadership of the CPCS, and contained critical references to Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy.[12]There was expressed warning that the Czechoslovak reform policy was ‘completely unacceptable’.[13]The Presidium of the CPCS Central Committee on July 18 rejected as unfounded the accusations made in the Warsaw Letter and affirmed that the country’s new policies were aimed at strengthening socialism.[14]

The clear signs of crisis in relations between Prague and Moscow appeared. On July 19 Moscow issued a summons to the CPCS Presidium, demanding that it meet July 22 or 23 with the Soviet Politburo in Moscow,
Kiev or Lvov to discuss internal Czechoslovak developments. 9 full members of the CPSU Politburo and the entire CPCS Presidium met on July 29 in the
Slovak village Cierna-nad-Tisou. Dubcek and the other reformats regarded the outcome of the Cierna talks as a ‘Czechoslovak victory’. It had brought the annulment of the Warsaw Letter; the departure of Soviet troops was guaranteed, and the country’s sovereignty had been defended.[15]

The fact that the agreement was regarded as the ‘victory’ shows that
Dubcek and the other reformers were really driven by naпvetй and idealism and hoped that they could create the socialism with the ‘human face’ without the interference from the Moscow side. They really underestimated their own significance to the Soviets. Moscow regarded the reformats developments in the Czechoslovakia as the real threat for the future of the all Communist Bloc. A common view that the danger of a Czechoslovak desertion from the socialist camp and a revision of foreign policy by the
Dubcek leadership hastened the Soviet decision to occupy the country militarily.[16]

The Invasion.

On August 16 the CPSU Politburo stated that “the CPCS was loosing its leading role in the country.”[17] This showed that the Soviet’s patience reached the end.

“When Moscow’s nerve breaks, Soviet tanks usually start rolling.”[18]
Armed forces of the SU, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded
Czechoslovakia in a swift military action during the night of August 20-21.
Dubcek and other Czech and Slovak leaders were arrested in the name of the
“revolutionary government of the workers and peasants.”[19] The main force of the initial invading units consisted of an estimated 200,000 troops. The number of invaders continued to increase during the following week and ultimately reached an estimated 650,000.[20]Most of the members of the CPCS
Presidium were shocked by the invasion. This proves again that they did not understand how serious the situation was before the invasion. From the
Moscow’s point of view the invasion was inevitable, because the further development of the socialism with the ‘human face’ would lead only to deeper escalation of tensions between the Czechoslovakia and the other WTO countries, and probably, to an escape of the country from the Communist
Bloc.

But the reformats did not give up. On August 21, the CPCS Central
Committee declared the statement that the invasion was taking place
“without the knowledge” of the Czechoslovak leaders, and that they regarded this act “as contrary not only to the fundamental principles of relations between Socialist states but also as contrary to the principles of international law.”[21]Although there was no organised resistance to the overwhelming occupation forces, Czechoslovak citizens, spearheaded by students, resorted to a wide variety of means to hamper the invaders, and several general strikes took place.[22]

On August 23, President Svoboda flew to Moscow. His journey represented an effort to find a way out of a situation: he was, in effect, trying to help the Soviets find a solution for the Czechoslovak crisis based on mutual political compromise.[23]On August 26 the Moscow agreement was concluded. The major outcomes were: (1) Dubcek was to carry on as the
First Secretary; (2) the invasion forces were to be gradually withdrawn;
(3) censorship was to be reintroduced; (4) the CPCS was to strengthen its leading position in the state.[24]One may assume that certain personnel changes were also assumed in Moscow, since resignations followed in due course. These changes included the removal of Dr. Kriegel from the CPCS
Presidium and the chairmanship of the National Front; of Ota Sik as Deputy
Premier; Josef Pavel as Minister of Interior; Jiri Hajek as Foreign
Minister; Zdenek Heizar as Director of Czechoslovak Radio; Jiri Pelikan as
Director of Czehoslovak Television.[25]

The invasion led to the formulation of so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, first formulated in a Pravda commentary on September 26, which amounts to denying in principle the sovereignty of any “socialist” country accessible to the SU. It asserts the region-wide right to intervention.[26]

For both rulers and ruled, the invasion of Czechoslovakia proved once again that the Soviets would use force to prevent developments they defined as contrary to their vital interests. The line they drew in 1968 to define their vital interests was the Leninist hegemony of the local Communist
Party.[27]

But the Soviets did not achieved what they wanted at once. What happened was that the invasion failed to achieve its primary purpose, which clearly was to produce a counterregime a la Kadar.[28]

The Situation After the Invasion.

The Dubcek leadership made great efforts after the invasion to satisfy the Soviets while trying not to compromise itself in the eyes of the population.[29]

Probably the major reform after the invasion was the creation of the
Slovak Socialist Republic. On October 28, the National Assembly approved a constitutional bill transforming the hitherto unitary state into a federation of two national republics. On January 1, 1969, the Slovak
Socialist Republic came into being.

Another crisis emerged in January 1969. On January 7, the new measures were taken designed to keep the press and the other media more strictly under control. In some cases, pre-publication censorship was reintroduced.[30]

The event which finally decided the fate of Dubcek is known as the
‘ice-hockey game affair.’ On March 28, the Czechoslovak ice-hockey team won over the SU team in World Ice Hockey Championship Competition. The same evening anti-Soviet demonstrations occurred throughout Czechoslovakia.
Aeroflot office was destroyed in Prague. On April 11 Gustav Husak declared that it was ‘high time’ to take radical steps to introduce order.[31]

Finally, on April 17 at the plenary session of the Central Committee
Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak (before that - the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party).

At the same session the CPCS Presidium with its twenty-one members and the Executive Committee with its eight members were replaced by an eleven members Presidium of which Dubcek (but no longer Smrkovsky) was still member. A few days later he was ‘elected’ Chairman of the Federal
Assembly with Smrkovsky as his deputy.

On January 28, 1970, the Central Committee plenum ‘accepted the resignation’ of Dubcek from the Central Committee. And finally, on June 25,
1970 at the session of the Central Committee he was expelled from the CPCS.
This was the end of his political career. But only until the end of the
Communism regime in 1989. At the end of December 1989 he was elected
Chairman of the Czech parliament.

Conclusion: Was the Reformist Communism Ever Possible?

The primary goal of Dubcek’s reforms was the creation of the socialism with a ‘human face’. Broadly speaking, the Czechoslovak reformers sought an adjustment of the standard Soviet model of socialism to the realities of what they considered an advanced industrialised socialist country enjoying a tradition of democracy and humanitarianism.[32]The stated opinions of the reformers could be summed as follows: (1) the CPCS should no longer maintain a monopoly of power and decision making; (2) it should rather prove its goals through equal competition by permitting a clash of ideas and interests; (3) the abandonment of this monopoly would in effect mean a sharing of power and permit criticism, opposition, and even control on the CPCS’s own exercise of power.[33]Of course, Dubcek was against the creation of the opposition parties, but he was for the pluralism inside the National Front. The essence of his reform conception was not the possibility of pluralism in the accepted sense but, rather, the obligation upon the CPCS to prove that its program was the only valid one for socialism.[34]